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Abstract 
The eye movements of expert players trying to solve a chess problem show that the first idea 
that comes to mind directs attention towards sources of information consistent with itself and 
away from inconsistent information. This bias continues unconsciously even when the player 
believes he is looking for alternatives. The result is that alternatives to the first idea are ignored. 
This mechanism for biasing attention ensures a speedy response in familiar situations but it can 
lead to errors when the first thought that comes to mind is not appropriate. We propose that this 
mechanism is the source of many cognitive biases from phenomena in problem solving and 
reasoning, to perceptual errors and failures in memory. 
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The Mechanism of the Einstellung (Set) Effect: A Pervasive Source of Cognitive Bias 
 
Four centuries ago, Francis Bacon pointed out the unfortunate human tendency to 
ignore new evidence which could undermine a firmly held opinion (Bacon, 1620/1939; p. 36.) 
Little has changed. Tetlock (2005) found that expert political scientists do not change their 
theories when events prove their predictions wrong; they keep the theories and discount the 
evidence. Similarly Gould (2006) showed that scientists can be so strongly influenced by the 
theory they already hold that they do not interpret new data objectively. The experts’ theories 
were originally based on an accumulation of evidence, so it is not that they cannot absorb new 
information. The question is: Why, once a point of view has been formed, do people find it 
difficult to assimilate new information if it is not consistent with the view already held? 
The answer is suggested by recent studies of the Einstellung (mental set) effect – the 
fixation of thought produced by prior experience - which demonstrate its power and reveal its 
mechanism (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008a; 2008b). Many cognitive biases that make it 
difficult for people to assimilate new evidence may have their origin in a similar mechanism to 
that which produces the Einstellung effect. The difficulties people have in assimilating new 
evidence may have the origin in a similar mechanism to that which produces the Einstellung 
effect. The effect is particularly dangerous because people are unaware that they are affected by 
it. As Stephen J. Gould noted: “In most cases … biases … were unknowingly influential and ... 
scientists believed they were pursuing unsullied truth” (p. 59). 
 
THE CLASSICAL EINSTELLUNG (SET) EFFECT 
 
The Einstellung effect occurs when an idea that comes immediately to mind in a 
familiar context prevents alternatives being considered. It was first experimentally 
demonstrated by Luchins (1942) with the water-jug problems. He gave people a series of 
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problems that could be solved by a fixed method which they quickly learnt. Then he gave them 
a problem that could be solved using the usual method but also with a different, quicker one 
(called the 2-solution problem because of two possible solutions). Most of the participants 
continued to use the old method, not spotting the quicker alternative. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that the old method solved the problem. However, when participants were 
presented with a final problem (called the 1-solution problem because there was only one 
solution possible), apparently similar to the previous ones but where the familiar method now 
did not work, many of the participants said that this problem was insoluble. In fact, it could be 
solved using the shorter method from the previous problem. The fixation of thought displayed 
by these people was demonstrated by a control group who were given only the 1-solution 
problem. They solved it quickly, showing that the problem was not intrinsically difficult. The 
experimental group failed to find the solution because the similarity of the final problem to the 
previous ones brought the usual (but now inappropriate) method to mind, blinding them to 
alternatives. 
 
THE EINSTELLUNG EFFECT IN (CHESS) EXPERTS 
 
We recently showed that the Einstellung phenomenon can not only be demonstrated 
with laypeople and simple logical problems but also with experts and complex problems 
(Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008b). We showed the position in Figure 1A to expert chess 
players and asked them to find the shortest solution. This is a 2-solution problem just as in the 
Luchins study. One solution is a five move sequence leading to a smothered mate. The 
smothered mate sequence is well known to all good chess players and the possibility that it 
could be used in this position was quickly noticed by all the players. The second solution is less 
familiar but shorter, leading to mate in three moves. Players spoke aloud as they tried to solve 
the problem. All players found the familiar solution quickly and then said they were looking for 
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a shorter one. Those who failed to find it (and said that the smothered mate was the shortest 
solution) were then shown the 1-solution problem (Figure 1B). This problem is the same as the 
2-solution problem except that the familiar smothered mate solution has been disabled by 
moving one piece, leaving only the shorter solution from the 2-solution problem. Hence, the 1-
solution problem was similar to the last problem in the Luchins design where the participants’ 
familiar solution would not solve the problem but an alternative method would. All players 
found the shorter solution in the 1-solution problem, showing that they were capable of finding 
it when not distracted by the familiar one2. 
 
QUANTIFYING THE EINSTELLUNG EFFECT  
 
Previously the Einstellung effect has only been reported as a qualitative effect. With 
chess players it can be quantified as the relative strength of different players is known precisely 
from their performance other players of known strength. The scale has a mean of 1500 and a 
standard deviation of 200. Table 1 gives the names of different groups and their strength 
relative to average players in terms of the number of standard deviations they are above the 
average). The Einstellung effect was quantified by seeing how much weaker a player had to be, 
when only the shorter solution was present (the 1-solution problem), to show comparable 
performance to that of a better player with the 2-solution problem when the distracting effect of 
the familiar solution was present. Across a range of skill levels, the presence of a familiar 
solution that first came to mind reduced the problem solving performance of the experts to that 
of players about three standard deviations lower in skill (see Table 1). The Einstellung effect is 
indeed a very powerful effect – the chance of a player being beaten by a player three standard 
deviations lower in skill is close to zero. Yet that is the level to which the first idea that came to 
mind on seeing the position – the presence of a smothered mate – reduced the ability of the 
players to find another solution. 
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Table 1.  2-solution problem (see Figure 1A for the problem). The percentage of stronger 
players who found the less familiar, shorter solution in the presence of the more familiar but 
longer solution. Player strength is given in SDs above the average for all chess players. 1-
solution problem (see Figure 1B for the problem). The percentage of both stronger and weaker 
players who found the less familiar, shorter solution when the more familiar one had been 
removed. Weaker players were presented with the 1-solution problem only. The difference 
between the 2-solution and 1-solution problem is the presence of the familiar solution which 
produces the Einstellung effect. We quantified the effect by comparing the performance of 
stronger players on the 2-solution problem with the performance of weaker players on the 1-
solution problem. The performance of International Masters (5 SDs above average) on the 2-
solution problem was comparable to that of Class A players (2 SDs above average) on the 1-
solution problem, the performance of Masters (4 SDs above average) was comparable to that of 
the Class B players (1 SD above average) and the performance of Candidate Masters (3 SDs 
above average) was the same as Class C players (average). Experiments with different 
problems and the more natural instruction to find the best solution rather than the shortest, 
yield similar quantitative differences between the performance of stronger players on the 2-
solution version of the problems and the performance of the weaker players on the 1-solution 
version of the problems (see Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008b).   
 
            
                              Problem 
                                  
Skill Level                        2-solution   1-solution 
            
Stronger players 
International Master (+5 SD)          50%       100% 
Master (+4 SD)           18%       100% 
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Candidate Master (+3 SD)           0%       100% 
 
Weaker players 
Class A (+2 SD)                                                                           63% 
Class B (+1 SD)                                                         13% 
Class C (average)               0% 
            
 
 
THE MECHANISM OF THE EINSTELLUNG (SET) EFFECT 
 
Why did the players experiencing the Einstellung effect fail to find the less familiar 
solution? We measured the eye movements of two new groups of chess experts who were given 
either the 2-solution problem or the 1-solution problem (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008a). 
This allowed us to see which squares the players were looking at and how long they spent 
looking at them as they tried to solve the problem. We used Candidate Masters (3 SD above 
average) and as in the previous experiment none of the group shown the 2-solution problem 
(Figure 1A) found the shorter solution while all the players shown the 1-solution problem 
(Figure 1B) found it. Although all the players trying to solve the 2-solution problem said that 
they looked for a shorter solution after spotting the familiar smothered mate solution, the eye 
movements, shown in Figure 1C, told a different story. The players’ eyes continued to dwell on 
squares and pieces involved in the familiar smothered mate solution (as shown by the green 
circles) throughout the time they believed they were looking for alternatives. They spent little 
time on the squares required to find the shorter solution (as shown by the red triangles). The 
group shown the 1-solution problem found the shorter solution without much difficulty. 
Initially, their attention, as measured by their eye movements shown in Figure 1D, was directed 
equally at squares and pieces involved in the solution and at those that were not. But shortly 
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before announcing that they had discovered the solution they started to focus on the key 
squares.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
 
The eye movement data demonstrate how a pattern of thought, once activated, can 
prevent other patterns of thought becoming active. As soon as a problem or situation is 
recognised as familiar, the knowledge (schema) for dealing with it is activated. The schema 
directs attention towards those aspects of the situation that are relevant to itself and away from 
those that are not. Thus a self-fulfilling circle begins with information consistent with the 
already activated schema being more likely to be picked up and inconsistent information 
ignored. Consequently the belief that the schema is the right one to deal with the situation is 
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confirmed and alternatives are less likely to be considered. At a conscious level the individuals 
think they are considering the evidence in an open-minded way, unaware that their attention is 
being directed selectively to certain aspects of the task. Those things that they notice are 
consistent with the active schema and they are confirmed in the view that the way they are 
dealing with the situation is the correct one. Things that do not fit in are either not noticed, or if 
they are, discarded because they do not fit the activated schema. 
 
A PERVASIVE BIASSING INFLUENCE ON COGNITION 
 
Problem solving failures caused by the Einstellung effect are the downside of a 
normally efficient cognitive mechanism. We rely on the knowledge acquired through by past 
experience to deal quickly with the familiar. It seems inefficient to spend time looking for an 
alternative solution if we already have an adequate one. Indeed, in complex real world 
situations people usually prefer to look for solutions that are good enough rather than trying for 
an elusive best that may be out of reach (Simon, 1990). Good solutions come from previous 
experience. But sometimes, as the Einstellung phenomena shows, this may be disadvantageous.  
We believe that a similar mechanism may lie behind a range of biases that have been 
shown in everyday thought. Once someone has a firmly entrenched idea about politics, the 
character of a colleague or the best way to perform a task, it can be difficult to persuade them to 
think differently (Gardner, 2004; Rokeach, 1960). People will accept a lower standard of 
evidence when accepting evidence that supports their view than they will do it for evidence that 
goes against it (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). People look for evidence that will confirm a 
currently held view rather than evidence that might disconfirm it (Wason, 1960; for a review, 
see Nickerson, 1998). The notoriously difficult insight problems studied by (Duncker, 1945) 
present an extreme case of the inability to overcome previously activated schemas. People 
repeatedly tried to solve the problem with the same method although it had repeatedly proved 
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unsuccessful. Even constant failure to find a solution is not enough to prevent people thinking 
of the same method when they face the same problem again (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 
2001). 
Expertise does not prevent this bias. Doctors form opinions quickly based on previous 
experience, often missing important aspects which are inconsistent with their initial opinion 
(Groopman, 2007). Political experts and scientists are so heavily influenced by their favourite 
theories that they ignore valid negative evidence (Gould, 1996; Tetlock, 2005). Experts do not 
realize that their favoured view seems so good because their attention has been directed to 
information that supports it and away from information that does not. 
A similar mechanism may lie behind biases in other areas of cognition. The part-set 
cuing phenomenon in memory demonstrates the distracting effect of already activated 
knowledge. For example, people who are asked to recall the names of American states and 
given a number of state names as examples, recall fewer names than people who are not given 
the examples (Brown, 1968; see also Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). The memories which 
have been activated by the experimenter impede access to other, un-activated areas of memory. 
The biasing of perceptual interpretation by prior knowledge is demonstrated when a well-
learned schema overwrites perceptual input. For example, correct description of a playing card 
requires a much longer exposure if the colour is reversed (a black three of hearts) than if it is 
normal. The effect can be surprisingly powerful. Even with exposures of a second, many cards 
are reported in their conventional rather than real colouring (a black three of hearts reported as 
a red three of hearts; Bruner & Postman, 1949).  
In each case described above, already activated knowledge biased the way people 
subsequently perceived and interacted with the world. This bias from schemas developed from 
previous experience is a blessing - without it we would have to deal with every situation as if 
we were encountering it for the first time. The mechanism which produces the Einstellung 
effect and many other biases in cognition shows that it can also be a curse. As John Maynard 
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Keynes once said, “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, 
which ramify ... into every corner of our minds” (1936/1973; p. xxiii). 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BOX: FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
The Einstellung effect resembles many biasing phenomena both in the laboratory and in 
everyday life. We hope that future work will establish if the mechanism we have shown to be 
behind one version of the Einstellung effect – the first activated thought biasing the subsequent 
allocation of attention and perceptual input – is also responsible for the other related 
phenomena. This ambitious goal may be approached with a mixture of behavioral and 
neuroimaging techniques. For example, the recordings of eye movements together with think 
aloud protocols during the classical Luchins water jug problem might show why people are 
unable to solve the 1-solution problem. Similarly, the mixture of eye tracking and think aloud 
protocols with the paradigms involving the perceptual judgements, confirmation bias and 
reasoning may provide evidence on the mechanism behind these phenomena. Neuroimaging 
techniques have been applied to understanding the brain mechanisms behind phenomena of 
selective attention which show some similarities to the biases in thought and memory discussed 
here. Future neuroimaging studies of people experiencing Einstellung may show that the same 
control circuits are involved in the selective biasing of thought and memory retrieval as are 
involved in selective pick-up of sensory information.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Notes 
1 Address correspondence to Merim Bilalić, Tübingen University, Experimental MR, 
Department of Neuroradiology, Hoppe-Seyler-Str. 3, 72076 Tübingen, Germany; e-mail: 
merim.bilalic@med.uni-tuebingen.de 
 
2 Unlike Luchins’ participants, all expert players found the solution once the familiar solution 
had been removed in the 1-solution problem. The effect had a cost on the problem solving 
process as shown by another group of experts who solved the 1-solution problem immediately, 
without being exposed to the 2-soution problem. This group of experts, which was comparable 
in skill with the one which solved both problems, found the optimal solution in half the time 
(37 seconds) it took the group who had previously experienced the Einstellung effect (78 
seconds). This result is at first sight paradoxical. The players who were exposed to the 2-
solution problem before were more familiar with the problem but nevertheless were slower to 
find the solution. The result is explained by a constant influence of the Einstellung effect which 
continues to distract experts even when it is removed (see Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008a).  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. A) The 2-solution problem. Players were instructed to find the shortest way for 
White to win the game. There are two solutions. The longer smothered mate solution is: 1. 
Qe6+ Kh8  2. Nf7+ Kg8  3. Nh6++ Kh8  4. Qg8+ Rxg8  5. Nf7 mate. A less familiar shorter 
solution is: 1. Qe6+ Kh8  2. Qh6! Rd7  3. Qxh7 mate, or 2.… Kg8  3. Qxg7 mate. B) The 1-
solution problem. This is the same position as the 2-solution problem except that the Bishop 
(encircled by the black dots) is on h5 rather than c6. Smothered mate is now no longer possible 
because Black’s bishop covers f7. The shorter solution is still possible. 1. Qe6+ Kh8   (If  1..... 
Kf8  2 Nxh7 mate)  2. Qh6! Rd7 3. Qxh7 mate, or 2.… Kg8  3. Qxg7 mate, or 2 … Bg6  3. 
Qxg7 mate. The squares crucial for the longer solution but not for the shorter one are 
highlighted in green (f7, g8 & g5) and those crucial for the shorter solution but not the longer 
one in red (b2, h6, h7 & g7). The problems are based on an idea by Saariluoma (1990). C) The 
percentage of time in different phases of problem solving that the experts (Candidate Masters) 
solving the 2-solution problem spent looking at squares crucial to the familiar long solution 
(green color) and shorter solution (red color). For each player the first 10 s and the last 5 s 
before announcing the solution were analysed separately. The remaining period, of whatever 
length, was divided into four equal periods. D) The same graph but this time showing the 
percentage of time the experts looking at the 1-solution problem spent looking at the crucial 
squares for the familiar longer and shorter solution. The familiar solution was disabled here.  
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Recommended Readings 
 
[1] Luchins, A. S. (1942). (See References). A historical classic; introduces the Einstellung 
(mental set) phenomenon in the psychological literature. [Can be obtained at the web collection 
of classical contributions in psychology http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/] 
 
[2] Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008b). (See References). Shows that the Einstellung 
effect can be demonstrated with experts, quantifies its strength, and offers theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon.  
 
[3] Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008a). (See References). Demonstrates the 
mechanism behind the Einstellung effect.  
 
[4] Samuel S, Kundel H. L, Nodine C. F., & Toto L. C. (1995). Mechanism of satisfaction of 
search: eye position recordings in the reading of chest radiographs. Radiology, 194, 895-902. 
The paper explains why expert radiographers tend to miss other important abnormalities once 
they have already found an abnormality.  
 
[5] Takahashi K., & Watanabe K. (2008). Persisting effect of prior experience of change 
blindness. Perception, 37, 324-7. A witty study showing that even cognitive scientists are not 
spared the negative influence of prior knowledge in a change detection task.  
